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EMPLOYMENT LAW 
NORMAN-BLOODSAW v. LAWRENCE 
BERKELEY LABORATORY 
135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 1 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
employers who conduct nonconsensual medical testing may be 
liable for invasion of privacy under the United States and Cali-
fornia Constitutions. 2 In addition, the court held that Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)3 protects employees 
from nonconsensual medical testing that has a disparate im-
pact on a protected groUp.4 The Ninth Circuit held, however, 
that the American's with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), does 
not limit the scope of the employee testing when the tests are 
1. 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998). The appeal from United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California, was argued and submitted on June 10, 1997 
before Circuit Judge Reinhart, Judge T.G. Nelson, and Judge Hawkins. The decision 
was med February 3, 1998. Judge Reinhardt authored the opinion. 
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. §§ 4, 5, 14.; See also Cal. CONST. art. I, § 1. Issues of 
material fact existed as to whether Lawrence had sufficient interest in obtaining the 
sensitive medical information and whether the employees had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, precluding summary judgment in employees' claims alleging violation of 
state and federal constitutional rights to privacy. See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence 
Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260, 1275 (9th Cir. 1998). 
3. See 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-2(a) (West 1988), which states in relevant part: "it is 
unlawful for any employer ... to discriminate [against) any individual with respect to 
his ... terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 
4. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1260. The employees contended that 
Lawrence singled out black employees and female employees generally for specific 
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admjnjstered after a job is offered and prior to actual employ-
ment.1I 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In Norman-Bloodsaw, the plaintiffs6 had applied for em-
ployment at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory ("Lawrence"), a 
research facility operated by the Regents of California under 
contract with the United States Department of Energy. 7 The 
employees filed suit against Lawrence, alleging a variety 
of claims including invasion of privacy and violations of 
Title VII and the ADA.8 They were notified in writing that 
employment was conditioned upon a medical examination. 9 
During the employment entrance examinations, the poten-
tial employees completed medical history questionnaires 10 and 
provided blood and urine samples. 11 Lawrence selectively 
tested the employees' blood and urine for syphilis, sickle cell 
trait, and pregnancy without their knowledge or consent. 12 
The district court granted Lawrence's motions for dismissal, 
judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment on all 
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)j See also Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1273. 
6. The seven named plaintiffs included present and former clerical and 
administrative employees of Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory. In September of 1995, 
these employees brought suit on behalf of all past and present Lawrence employees 
who had ever been subjected to the medical tests at issue. See Norman-Bloodsaw v. 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory,135 F.3d 1260, 1264 -1265 (9th Cir. 1998). 
7. See id. at 1264. The Defendant-Appellees included Lawrence, Lawrence's 
Laboratory's Director, four physicians in the medical department, the Secretary of the 
Department of Energy, and the Regents of the University of California. See id. at 
1265. 
8. See id at 1264. 
9. See id. at 1264, 1265. Lawrence notified all employees of the health exams, 
with the exception of one, indicating they needed -medical examinations," -medical 
approval: or ~ealth evaluations." The one exception was an employee hired years 
before the others, who underwent an examination after commencing employment. Two 
of the employees underwent examinations on subsequent occasions as well as at hire. 
See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1264, 1265. 
10. See id. at 1265. The questionnaires inquired about whether the employees 
had ever had any of sixty-one medical conditions including sickle cell anemia, venereal 
disease and menstrual disorders. See id. 
11. See id. 
12. See id. at 1264. 
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claims. 13 Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court's dismissal of the ADA claims, the Ninth Circuit held that 
summary judgment was inappropriate on the privacy claims 
under the United States 1. and California Constitutions. 15 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit held the employees stated a cause 
of action for violation of Title VII. 16 The Ninth Circuit also 
found that fact issues precluded summary judgment as to stat-
utes of limitation. 17 
13. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1266. The district court concluded that all 
of the ADA claims were time-barred. The district court also concluded the privacy 
claims were time-barred and, in the alternative, the testing did not violate the 
employees' right to privacy. The court further concluded the employees failed to state a 
viable Title VII claim. See id. 
14. U.S. CONST. amend. §§ 4,5,14. The Ninth Circuit generally analyzes medical 
tests and examinations, which evoke due process and Fourth Amendment protections, 
as it would a person's Fourth Amendment right to be free from illegal searches and 
seizures. Accordingly, a court must balance the government's interest in conducting 
the tests in question with the public employees right to privacy. See Norman-
Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1269 (citing Yin v. California 95 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 1996) 
cert denied, _U.S._, 117 S.Ct 955,136 L.Ed.2d 842 (1997). 
15. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. A plaintiff must establish three threshold 
elements for a cause of action under the California Constitution right to privacy: (1) a 
legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy given the 
circumstances; and (3) defendant's serious invasion of the protected privacy interest. 
The court must then balance the defendant's countervailing interests against the 
intrusion on the privacy interest at stake. Less intrusive alternatives to defendant's 
conduct may rebut defendant's countervailing interests. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 
F.3d at 1271 (citing Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200, 1228 (1997) (quoting Hill 
v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 Cal.4th I, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 633, 657 (1994), cert. 
denied, _U.S._, 118 S.Ct. 44, 139 L.Ed.2d 11 (1997». 
16. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Questions of material fact existed as to when 
the employees knew or had reason to know that Lawrence was testing for the medical 
and genetic information. Therefore the district court's granting of summary judgment 
was reversed with respect to the statutes of limitation for causes of action under Title 
VII and the U.S. and California Constitutional privacy rights. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 
135 F.3d at 1266. 
17. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1266. The Ninth Circuit disposed of 
Lawrence's contention that the employees' claims were untimely. Citing Trotter v. 
International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 704'F.2d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 
1983), the court held that the statute of limitations begins to run when "the plaintiff 
knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.' Norman-
Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d. at 1266. The record strongly suggested that the employees had no 
knowledge of the particular testing involved at the time of the examinations. 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the factual issue as to when the employees 
had reason to know Lawrence was testing for sensitive medical information should 
have gone to trial. See id. at 1266, 1267. 
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III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF 
PRIvACY 
1. Federal Constitutional Claim 
The Ninth Circuit first noted that one of the most basic 
violation of one's constitutional right to privacy is performing 
unauthorized medical testS. 18 Further, according to the court, 
when the test involves intimate matters relating to one's sexual 
and genetic history, the Constitution offers even greater protec-
tion. 19 The court stated that Lawrence's unauthorized acquisi-
tion of previously unrevealed medical information could be 
characterized as a search in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.2O In addition, the non-consensual testing violated the 
employees' rights under the Due Process Clause21 of the Fifth 
or Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 22 
In balancing the government's interest against the employ-
ees' privacy expectations, the court considered three factors. 23 
The court weighed (1) the degree of intrusiveness of the tests; 
(2) Lawrence's justifications for the tests; (3) and the "efficacy 
of the state's means for meeting its needs.» The Ninth Circuit 
found that the testing significantly invaded the employees' pri-
18. Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th 
Cir.1998). 
19. See id. at 1269. The Constitution protects employees from an employer's 
"unrestrained inquiries" into personal sexual matters unrelated to job performance. 
See id., (citing Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1336 (9th Cir. 
1987), citing, Thome v. City ofEI Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 470 (9th Cir. 1983». 
20. 135 F.3d at 1269 (citing Yin v. California, 95 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 1996), 
cert. denied, _U .S._, 117 S.Ct 955, 136 L.Ed.2d 842 (1997». 
21. The Due Process Clause states, aNo person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law .... " See U.S. CONST. amend. V. "Nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." See 
U.S. CONST. amend. XlV § 1 " 
22. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1269 (citing Yin, 95 F.3d at 870). 
23. Lawrence is considered a public entity since it operates under state and 
federal agencies, thereby making the Fourth Amendment analysis applicable. See id. at 
1266. In accordance with general Ninth Circuit practice the court chose a Fourth 
Amendment analysis of the medical testing at issue. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d 
at 1269 (citing Yin, 95 F.3d at 873, quoting Veronica School District 47J v. Acton, 515 
U.S. 646, 660, (1995». 
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vacy rights even though the employees agreed to the examina-
tions, filled out questionnaires relating to similarly sensitive 
information and furnished blood and urine samples to the ex-
aminers.24 In accordance with the United States Supreme 
Court decision, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Asso-
ciation, the Ninth Circuit separated an employee's relinquish-
ment of blood and urine samples from the further intrusion of 
actually testing the bodily fluids.25 Thus, agreeing to a general 
medical examination or filling out a questionnaire did not 
equate to unljmjted authorization for testing of intimate, per-
sonal health matters. 
2. California Constitutional Claim 
Unlike a federal privacy claim, which does not require a 
showing that the defendant's invasion was serious,26 the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the requirements of a privacy claim un-
der Article I § 1 of the California Constitution are more rigor-
OUS.27 The Ninth Circuit found three threshold requirements 
for a cause of action under Article I § 1:'( 1) a legally protected 
privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy given 
the circumstances; and (3) defendant's serious invasion of the 
protected privacy interest. The court found a privacy interest 
arose under the California Constitution due to the sort of in-
formation Lawrence's tests revealed.28 Therefore, consonant 
with the federal privacy claim, summary judgment on the state 
claim was inappropriate because a factual dispute existed re-
24. See Normnn-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1268, 1270. The court reasoned that 
acquiescence to a lesser intrusion of privacy such as fIlling in a questionnaire does not 
authorize further intrusions even if they are tangentially related. See id. 
25. See id., at 1270. Taking a person's bodily fluid implicates one's privacy 
interests. The medical analysis of the sample, however, is a further intrusion of the 
employee's privacy interests. See id., note 13 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).) 
26. Under the federal standard, the application of the balancing test requires an 
evaluation of three elements. See discussion supra. The Ninth Circuit cited Yin v. 
California, 95 F.3d 864, 873, quoting Veronica School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 
646,660 (1995». See Normnn-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1269, 1271. 
27. See Normnn-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1271. 
28. The court cited Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P .2d at 1232 (finding procedure 
that, inter alia, "authorizes testing in order to acquire information concerning the 
internal state of the tested individual's body" to clearly intrude upon state privacy 
interests). See Normnn-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1271, n. 17. 
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garding Lawrence's interest in obtaining the information and 
the employees reasonable expectation of privacy. 29 
B. TITLE VII CLAIMS 
Relying on Griggs v. Duke Power CO.,30 the Ninth Circuit de-
termined that the employees' claims fell within the framework 
of a Title VII cause of action.3l The employees alleged that 
Lawrence performed additional tests based on their sex and 
race, namely pregnancy tests for women and sickle cell trait 
testing for African Americans. 32 Even if this nonconsensual 
testing did not rise to the level of unconstitutionality, the court 
noted that it was still an appropriate basis for a Title VII claim 
since the tests qualified as a "term or condition" based on a 
statutorily protected category.33 Lastly, the court explained 
that the Title VII action would stand whether or not the dis-
criminatory testing caused any employees not to be hired. 34 
29. See id. at 1271. See supra note 8 for complete discussion of threshold 
requirements. 
30. 401 u.s. 424, 432-36 (1971) (holding that facially neutral testing requirements 
that are not reasonable measures of job performance and have a disparate impact on 
hiring of minorities violate Title VII). 
31. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1271. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 prohibits employment practices which have an adverse impact on a protected 
group. Title VII §703(a) provides "it is unlawful for any employer to fail or refuse to 
hire ... or otherwise to discriminate any individual with respect to his ... terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color religion 
sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a). 
32. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1272. The Ninth Circuit noted that 
whether or not a person carries sickle cell trait relates to sensitive information about 
family history and reproductive decision making. See id. at 1270. 
33. Id. 
34. Id., n. 18, citing Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671,676 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that unlawful personnel action that "tumlsl out to be inconsequential goes to 
the issue of damages, not liability"); see also EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504 
(9th Cir.1989). 
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C. ADA CLAIMS 
Two employees had standing to challenge the medical test-
ing under the Americans with Disabilities Act.35 These two 
employees alleged that Lawrence violated the ADA by requir-
ing medical examinations that were neither job related, nor 
consistent with business necessity. 36 
The Ninth Circuit first noted that the ADA divides medical 
exams into three distinct categories: (1) "pre-employment in-
quiries and examinations"; (2) "employment entrance examina-
tions"; and (3) examinations conducted anytime thereafter.37 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that Lawrence's medical testing 
fell within the ADA's second category because the tests were 
administered after the employees received written offers of 
employment and prior to the commencement of their job du-
ties.38 Consequently, the court held that Lawrence did not vio-
late the ADA because "employment entrance examinations" 
need not be justified by job related functions nor consistent 
with business necessity. 39 
The Ninth Circuit confmned that the ADA only guarantees 
that the information gathered by an employer will be kept con-
fidential and limits an employer's actual use of the informa-
tion.40 Under the ADA, employers are completely unrestricted 
with respect to the scope of an employee entrance exam, as long 
as it is conducted after an offer of employment has been made 
35. The ADA protections became effective in regards to public entities on January 
26, 1992. Only two Lawrence employees underwent medical testing on or after that 
date. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1273, n. 21. 
36. See id. at 1273. "A covered entity shall not require a medical examination ... 
unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job related and consistent with 
business necessity." 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (c )(4). 
37. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1273; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d). Pre-
employment examinations are those conducted prior to an offer of employment. 
Employment entrance examinations are those conducted after an applicant is offered a 
job, yet actual employment is typically conditioned upon the testing. results. 
38. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1273. 
39. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1273. Employment entrance examinations 
are those conducted "after an offer of employment has been made" but "prior to the 
commencement of '" employment duties." See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3). 
40. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1273. See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 
12112(d)(3)(B) & (C ). 
7
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but before the employee begins their duties. 41 Thus, the court 
concluded that ADA did not apply to the medical and genetic 
testing performed by Lawrence.42 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit, in Norman-Bloodsaw, placed limits upon 
an employer's ability to perform medical inquiries into their 
employees' background. Employers can be found liable for in-
vasion of privacy claims. Moreover, employees can assert Title 
VII claims if the medical testing creates an adverse impact on a 
statutorily protected group. 43 
Even though the Ninth Circuit held that under the ADA a 
business justification was not required for the particular type 
of testing at issue in Norman-Bloodsaw, employers should fol-
low recommended policies to avoid general exposure to other 
claims such as, privacy claims, Title VII claims, and ADA 
claims in other categories.44 
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B). 
42. The employees also alleged that Lawrence violated the ADA by not providing 
or adequately describing how sensitive information was safeguarded. See Norman-
Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1274. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the employees failed to 
state a violation of the ADA record keeping requirements because they merely alleged 
that Lawrence did not adequately describe safegurds to prevent dissemination of 
sensitive medical information. See id. Furthermore, the ADA does not restrict records 
that may be kept to matters that are "job related and consistent with business 
necessity." See id. at 1273; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B). 
43. Liability can be minimized if (1) the employer obtains an employee's written 
consent for the specific medical testing; (2) the employee is provided advanced notice of 
the testing; (3) the disclosure of results is limited to a very specific category of persons; 
and (4) the testing procedures are the least intrusive possible. See U.S. Congress, 
Office of Technology Assessment, Medical Testing and Health Insurance, OTA-H-384 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office) August 1988 at 101, as cited in 
BNA special report, Workplcree Privcrey, 2nd edition by Ira Michael Shepard, Robert L. 
Duston and Karen S. Russell, (1989). 
44. When determining whether an employer's screening practices comply with 
federal and state laws, the following inquiry is recommended. First, an employer 
should consider whether it has a business justification for requiring a particular 
applicant or employee to complete a questionnaire or take an examination. Further, an 
employer should have a business justification for each medical inquiry, each question 
asked or procedure performed. Employers should assess whether their justification 
applies to all jobs or only to certain positions. In addition, employers should examine 
who will have access to the results of the medical exams. Lastly, employers must 
ascertain what will be done with testing results. An employer must be able to 
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Looking forward, a careful balance must be struck between 
an employer's need to screen employees and employees' desires 
to be free from unwanted involvement in their private lives. 
Cristina E. Echevarria· 
articulate under what circumstances will they refuse to hire or transfer an applicant 
based on test results. See BNA Special Report, Workplace Privacy, 2nd edition by Ira 
Michael Shepard, Robert L. Duston and Karen S. Russell, at 191, (1989). 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1999. 
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